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Over the past twenty years there has been an explosion of emerging-market
crises and a vast accumulation of commentary—descriptive, theoretical,
and applied—highlighting the origins and mechanics of each crisis and of
crises in general. There is plenty of analysis on how to deal with crises both
in terms of prevention and of cures. Is it possible now to distill from all this
analysis a simple set of propositions that summarize the experience and
capture the chief lessons?
This paper attempts to set out a few propositions that summarize what is
known and accepted. The purpose in doing so is to promote a set of pre-
sumptions that define unsound practice with a presumption that it cannot
fail to engender, in time, a crisis. Moreover, crises are not merely financial
experiences; rather, they involve large and lasting social costs and impor-
tant redistribution of income and wealth. These consequences make it es-
pecially important to secure agreement on what constitutes bad practice
and to identify areas of continuing controversy.
16.1 Slow versus Fast and Bad Regimes versus Big Collapses
A useful distinction can be drawn between old-style (slow-motion) crises,
which focus on the financing of the current account in a financially re-
pressed economy, and the new-style balance sheet crises of a financially
opened economy. The distinction is useful not only to highlight what is new
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but also to help policy makers understand the great speed of new-style
crises and their devastating cost compared to earlier experiences.
Old-style crises involve a cycle of overspending and real appreciation that
increasingly worsens the current account; while resources are ample, and
before real appreciation bites into growth, the process is politically popular.
In time, resources become more limited, and unpleasant options such as de-
mand restraint and trade restrictions must be mounted, but they cannot
last. Ultimately devaluation comes, and the process begins all over again.
The “stabilization” may last if there is little accommodation, but if money
is passive and the increased external room is used for quick expansion, the
process is more nearly a regime of an inflation-devaluation spiral.
Exchange rate adjustments in an old-style setting have very few qualities
of a crisis. Richard Cooper has noted that these events normally or invari-
ably involve the fall of the finance minister, but little more. The central is-
sue, as Diaz-Alejandro (1966) noted, is the fall of the real wage and the pol-
itics surrounding it.1 Because finance is repressed, the buildup of sensitive
balance sheets is ruled out. One example of the few old-style situations still
in play is Egypt, where occasionally a widely anticipated moderate devalu-
ation happens to relieve trickling reserve losses from current account im-
balances and suitcase capital flight.
An important part of the story, obscuring its simplicity, is the occasional
arrival of external resources (new access to the world capital market, the
World Bank, etc.), which provides room for better growth without the early
arrival of the external constraint. However, these resources more often than
not are debt and hence have an adverse eﬀect on the current account. Ac-
cordingly, unless there is significant productivity growth, trend real wages
will have to decline in order to generate debt service. Alternatively, new re-
sources or debt reduction must make room to keep up real wages.
A new-style crisis involves doubt about creditworthiness of the balance
sheet of a significant part of the economy—private or public—and the ex-
change rate. It may originate with questions about either the balance sheet
or the exchange rate, but when there is a question about one, the implied
capital flight makes it immediately a question about both. In no time, capi-
tal flight wipes out reserves and precipitates a currency collapse. That pro-
cess is only brought to an end by a resolution of the credit issues and the
commitment of monetary policy. External intervention has high leverage in
resolving credit and credibility issues.
The capital account plays a key role in the run-up to the crisis and in its
unfolding. There is too much credit on the way in, and far too little once the
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1. Diaz-Alejandro (1984), writing about the debt crisis of the early 1980s, keenly appreciated
that finance had now become the key actor and aptly signaled this with the catchy title “We
Are Not in Kansas Anymore.” He would have needed yet another title to characterize the ex-
traordinary increase in size and speed of the finance factor in recent crises.
crisis hits. The bankers’ adage is “it’s not speed that kills, but the sudden
stop.” Taussig (1927) captured the point when he wrote,
The loans from creditor countries . . . begin with modest amounts, then
increase and proceed crescendo. They are likely to be made in exception-
ally larger amounts toward the culminating stage of a period of activity
and speculative upswing, and during that stage become larger from
month to month so long as the upswing continues. With the advent of
crises, they are at once cut down sharply, even cease entirely. (130)
The central part of the new-style crisis is the focus on balance sheets and
capital flight. Balance sheet issues are, of course, fundamentally linked to
mismatches; even if there were solvency, they still create vulnerability re-
lated to liquidity problems. Exchange rate depreciation, in a mismatch sit-
uation, works in an unstable fashion to increase the prospect of insolvency
and hence the urgency of capital flight.
Because new-style crises involve the national balance sheet, they involve
a far more dramatic impact on economic activity than mere current account
disturbances; this larger impact arises in terms of both the magnitude of the
financial shock and the disorganization eﬀects stemming from illiquidity or
bankruptcy.2
16.2 Vulnerabilities
Sources of vulnerability include a substantially misaligned exchange rate
and balance sheet problems. Trouble in the balance sheet can come in one
of two ways: exposure, or existing holes in the form of nonperforming loans.
Nonperforming loans or vulnerable loans speak for themselves, although
one should note that they limit the room for higher interest rates and hence
are a major problem for an interest rate defense. The other problem is ex-
posure in the form of mismatches. In a national balance sheet there can be
two kinds of mismatches: maturity mismatches, which lead to liquidity is-
sues, and currency mismatches. In a situation in which the willingness to
hold assets on current terms is impaired, these misalignments or mis-
matches become explosive. The willingness to hold assets can be impaired
because there is a question either about the exchange rate or about the will-
ingness and ability of debtors to meet their liabilities.
The exchange rate can be the starting point of a crisis when it is patently
out of line. This is typically the case in exchange rate–based disinflation pro-
grams, which succeed in bringing down inflation but do so at the cost of a
significant real appreciation. The resulting widening of the current account
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2. Disorganization eﬀects are developed in Blanchard and Kremer (1997) to aid under-
standing of the output collapse in transition economies but have not been applied in the set-
ting of emerging-markets crises, where they are as useful a guide to grasping dramatic output
adjustments.
deficit and the disappearance of growth from appreciation, and as a result
of increased interest rates required to attract continued financing, make it
obvious that the program cannot last because it is not self-correcting. At
some point (see below for details) a speculative attack occurs that cannot be
met by high rates or reserve depletion. At that point, currency depreciation
interacts with balance sheet issues. The worse the balance sheets, the bigger
the collapse.
The initial large real appreciation of an exchange rate is often justified by
the argument that it reflects restructuring-induced dramatic rates of pro-
ductivity growth, generating inflation of the Balassa-Samuelson kind. The
argument is invariably suspect because this appreciation should not aﬀect
manufacturing price-based competitiveness measures and is less likely to be
the case in an environment where unemployment is high and rising and the
current account is deteriorating.
What are sustainable rates of real appreciation or of current account
deficits, and what invites a crisis? Because of such issues as lasting improve-
ments in capital market access, persistent terms-of-trade improvements,
and productivity growth, emerging economies can experience trend real ap-
preciation; they certainly can expect to finance some deficit-GDP ratio on
an ongoing basis. It is safe to say, however, that a rapid real appreciation
(say, over two or three years) amounting to 25 percent or more and an in-
crease in the current account deficit to exceed 4 percent of GDP, without
prospect of correction, take a country into the red zone.
Mexico with its recurrent end of sexennio currency collapses is an ex-
ample of an economy in which the exchange rate and the current account
are in the foreground and concern about the possibility of a devaluation (or
the fact of a small devaluation) triggers massive capital flight. Because de-
valuation is postponed by shortening and dollarizing debt (the Tesobonos
issue; see below) the balance sheet issues triggered by the currency depreci-
ation are huge.
Consider next a balance sheet with substantial nonperforming loans. If
interest rates are lowered, the currency comes under attack. If interest rates
are raised, the loan portfolio goes even further under water. This is com-
monly a situation that leads to a crisis.
Consider as examples Thailand and Malaysia, which in 1997 had sub-
stantial nonperforming loans. In Thailand these were in real estate and con-
sumer finance, whereas in Malaysia they included stock market loans that
had financed a market boom. Protracted unwillingness to raise mandated
lending rates brought about a “carry trade,” and the pressure on the cur-
rency created an oﬀshore market and ultimately led to crisis.
A large budget deficit and large short-term public debt are factors of vul-
nerability. A change in the growth prospects undermines the sustainability
of debt, as does an increase in world interest rates, and thus undermines the
willingness to hold and add to lenders’ portfolios. The same is true of the
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perception that the willingness to service the debt is impaired. The result is
a flight from public debt, and the direction of that flight is invariably foreign
assets. The resulting funding crisis translates into increased interest rates,
which further worsen the fiscal situation and thus act in a destabilizing fash-
ion.
For example, Brazil’s crisis was centered on a large short-term debt, part
of which was dollar-linked; depreciation prospects put debt service into the
express lane, and actual depreciation completed the picture.
Argentina in late 2000 is a case in point. A deteriorated growth outlook
put into question the financing of budget deficits and the rollover of the
public debt by external creditors. Interest rates shot up, and the prospect of
a massive capital flight was in the air. A massive International Monetary
Fund (IMF) loan postponed the fiscal crisis until further notice.
If the exchange rate is fixed, reserves are being depleted, and that process
increasingly adds currency risk to the equation. If the rate is flexible, depre-
ciation ensues and increasing depreciation is projected. That in turn may
spread risks to foreign exchange–denominated parts of the balance sheet
and aggravate capital flight.
Banking problems are a frequent part, and possibly the initiating factor,
of a currency crisis. When creditors of short-term interbank lines, or depos-
itors, withdraw from suspect banks, the resulting flows tend to go oﬀ-
shore and hence translate into reserve losses or depreciation. The situation
is likely to become a banking and foreign exchange crisis: the worse the non-
performing loan situation, the larger the maturity mismatching in the bal-
ance sheet, and the more significant the mismatching of denominations on
the asset and liability side.
It is invariably important to look behind the balance sheet of the banking
system at the underlying exposure generated by the banks’ loan customers.
Although the banks’ balance sheets may look proper, the loan customers
may have mismatching on their books and hence may shift it to the bank-
ing system if and when they run into trouble.
It is also important to recognize that a banking system’s situation can
change dramatically in a very short time. This easily happens when a con-
centration of liabilities (say, real estate loans) becomes bad, or a spell of
high interest rates causes a general deterioration of a loan portfolio that had
been only slightly above marginal. If the banking system’s funding is short-
term, the makings of a crisis emerge very quickly.
The Turkish crisis of December 2000 is a great example. In a situation of
a large number of bad banks (not the major part of the banking system
though), a withdrawal of credit lines triggered a banking crisis; the central
bank financed the run on the banks by pumping in credit only to repurchase
the liquidity in selling foreign exchange. Reserve depletion within days
threatened the maintenance of an IMF-supported, exchange rate–based
stabilization program.
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The corporate sector, like the banking system, has balance sheets that are
vulnerable to mismatch issues of maturity and denomination. The larger
the corporate sector’s short-term debt in the national balance sheet, the
more vulnerable the country is to a funding crisis, which can then become a
currency crisis. Once again, when credit to a particular sector is withdrawn,
in emerging markets that means a capital outflow and not a substitution
into other assets. For that reason, balance sheet problems become currency
crisis issues.
Indonesia and Korea are examples of countries where formidably bad
balance sheets—huge debt-equity ratios and large foreign exchange expo-
sure—were a major part of the crisis situation. Typically, it takes weeks to
determine just how large the external exposure is. Creditors will be reluctant
to take haircuts, and debtors are under no pressure to yield. The protracted
debt problem overshadows postcrisis credit normalization.
Whenever capital flight emerges, the question of the exchange rate
regime is immediate. Under fixed rates, that means the amount of reserves
the central bank has and is willing to commit; under managed or flexible
rates, it means the extent and speed at which the rate will depreciate. Either
way, the question is how urgent it is to bring money out. Once that ques-
tion emerges, the answer is already very urgent. Reserves are almost never
suﬃcient to withstand a balance sheet attack, and often they are less than
reported.
Vulnerability can, at least conceptually, be expressed in terms of a value-
at-risk exercise: what are the relevant shocks, what are the exposure areas,
and how large a deterioration of the balance sheet would result? Mis-
matches are the key triggers of extreme vulnerability, and the worse the risk
in part of the balance sheet, the more likely that it will spread to all of it—
if only because, in case of doubt, creditors want recovery and asset holders
refrain from lending.
An example of this phenomenon is provided by the Asian economies,
which experienced crises due to bad corporate financial structures (high
debt, high foreign exchange debt) relative to equity and a high ratio of short-
term external liabilities to reserves. The combination made for fireworks.
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Table 16.1 Critical Indicators: 1996 (%)
Country Corporate Debt/Equity Short-Term External Debt/Reserves
Indonesia 310 177
Korea 518 193
Malaysia 150 41
The Philippines 160 80
Thailand 250 100
Source: World Bank
16.3 Timing
There is no hard and fast rule about the timing of crises. It is surprising
how long basically unsustainable situations can endure, notably if an elec-
tion is in sight. With an election on the horizon, creditors are willing to be-
lieve that action be taken to hold oﬀ a crisis or a corrective devaluation. At
such a time, they believe, governments will do anything, including institut-
ing high interest rates and (preferably) shortening maturities and redenom-
inating claims into foreign exchange. As a result, crises happen after elec-
tions, not before. This phenomenon is akin to the myopic political business
cycle but is no less real. It is clear that the more the crisis is postponed, the
worse the balance sheet, and the larger the fallout, once it does happen.
Mexico, for example, always postpones crises until after the election. So did
Brazil, Korea, and Russia. The post-election discovery of a Taiwan bank-
ing problem, and crisis, is another instance.
Bad balance sheets—as opposed to significant overvaluation, escalating
current account deficits, or vanishing growth—in principle can last almost
forever provided net inflows cover up the hole and transparency is absent
(“clear water, no fish,” as the Chinese saying goes). As a result, the prover-
bial straw that broke the camel’s back can easily be the trigger. A relatively
minor event might break a precarious refinancing scheme, or a suspicion
arising anywhere else in the world might cause creditors to kick the tires
somewhere else. Importantly, changes in the relative attractiveness of do-
mestic and foreign assets or a change in the growth scenario can suddenly
bring the test of the balance sheet and, with it, the move to crisis. If the bal-
ance sheet is bad enough, as a rule, quite small events are suﬃcient to un-
dermine the funding scenario and precipitate the crisis.
For example, Turkey had forever been on the short list for a crisis but
somehow got by. The failure of a Rumanian subsidiary of a bad Turkish
bank, in an environment of political agitation about a sleazy banking sys-
tem, started the stone rolling, and within days Turkey reached the prospect
of immediate currency collapse.
Contamination easily fits the pattern of balance sheets that are bad
enough to invite an accident. When that is the case, in time the right cir-
cumstances for a crisis will materialize. This takes longer than one would
expect, but then it happens faster than one would have thought. A shift in
the external environment—Group of Three exchange rates, federal interest
rates, a slump in new commodity exports—can work as a trigger. The
spread of crisis in Asia fits this pattern.
16.4 Good Balance Sheets, No Crisis
Do countries with good balance sheets and a currency that is not vastly
misaligned face crisis risks? Of course, there is the trivial answer that for any
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exchange rate or any balance sheet there can exist a shock large enough to
render it unviable. However, the striking fact of the past twenty years of
crises is surely this: well-managed emerging-market economies have su-
ﬀered slowdowns in growth, high interest rates, and currency depreciation,
but they have not suﬀered crises. Moreover, the better the balance sheets,
the better the ability to absorb shocks to capital flows and trade without
outsized adjustments in exchange rates or interest rates. The proposition
“good balance sheets, no crisis” risks circularity, but, pending a good
counter example, I will let it strand. The good balance sheets of banks in
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Argentina are a large part of why these coun-
tries, while surely aﬀected, were not pushed under by the crises of Mexico
or Russia and Brazil.
16.5 Why Are Collapses so Large?
Currency collapses are large for two reasons: the interaction of mismatch
factors and the diﬃculty governments face, once a meltdown is underway,
in establishing their willingness and ability to engage in an uncompromis-
ing stabilization eﬀort. In this environment, the IMF’s role is to restore
credibility and hence credit.3
The interaction of mismatch factors produces an instability in the re-
sponse of asset holders: the more the exchange rate goes, the more bankrupt
the balance sheet, and hence the more reason to deny credit and get out.
The higher the maturity mismatch, the more liquid the creditors, and the
more easily the debtor is moved into the gray zone between illiquidity and
insolvency. The interaction of depreciation and illiquidity causes markets to
cease functioning, and thus record interest rates and (initially) a vast over-
shooting of exchange rates are the rule.
The crisis itself weakens the government politically and makes doubtful
its willingness to stick with a policy that dries up credit and hence starves
oﬀ capital flight. The absence of eﬀective property rights and of trans-
parency renders the possibility of bottom-fishing very hazardous. Hence,
there are no capital inflows and no stabilizing speculation, and only a one-
way downward pressure on asset prices, the currency, and the balance
sheets. Indonesia, with a political collapse and an ongoing struggle about
who will pay the debts and who will gain, oﬀers a clear case of an unresolved
crisis.
Disorganization in the Blanchard-Kremer sense becomes a dramatic is-
sue when creditworthiness collapses and bankruptcy spreads to attack the
real economy. The real economy is a complex layer of relationships in two
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3. For the Asian economies, the initial level is January 1999; for Mexico, January 1994; for
Brazil and Russia, January 1998. The most recent data are for December 2000.
ways. First, there are input-output relationships that can be disrupted at
any point in the chain because a critical supply or demand link disappears
and hence impairs or destroys the whole chain. Second, there is often a
credit relationship, rather than cash and carry, and this is sensitive to cred-
itworthiness suspicions and can become the disruptive factor. Disorganiza-
tion is an important part of the output collapse.
The IMF’s role in reversing the dramatic immediate events is twofold.
First, it oﬀers a commitment device for governments to underwrite a stabi-
lization strategy that is known to work. Second, it oﬀers temporary credits
and debt reorganization, including lock-up of short-term credits and com-
mercial bank credits, and thus helps stem the outflows.
High interest rates may hurt growth and the balance sheets, but they def-
initely stem the depreciation of the currency. Ultimately that is the single
most important beachhead of the stabilization program. As long as the cur-
rency melts, there is no prospect of stabilization. (Below I discuss an alter-
native to controls.) In the collapse phase, currencies depreciate formidably
relative to any current account-based view of what is necessary for adjust-
ment. They are driven by the capital account. When a credible program is
put in place, there is a rapid normalization, as in Korea or Brazil.
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Fig. 16.1 Real exchange (initial level index = 100)
Source: JPMorgan data
The adoption of an IMF strategy and demonstrated adherence soon shut
oﬀ the hemorrhage and turn an economy around into currency recovery
and a decline in interest rates. The combination of postcollapse, over-
depreciated exchange rates and a credible credit program provides for ap-
preciating exchange, and declining interest, rates. A virtuous circle begins.
Wavering commitment, by contrast, remains reflected in volatile currency
and high interest rates.
16.6 Costs
Currency crises are formidably expensive; even more so is a history of re-
current crises. The costs arise in three ways: a substantial increase in public
debt associated with the crisis, a loss of output and disruption, and the pos-
sibility of socially controversial redistribution of income and wealth.
In a currency crisis, because the government will bail out banks and (of-
ten) even companies, public debt increases substantially, and, with it, future
tax liabilities. The deterioration in public finance also arises from a period
of high interest rates in the run-up to the crisis and in the stabilization phase.
It will also arise from the fall in output and hence tax revenues in the crisis
period. Moreover, the increase in debt may itself bear the seeds of future cri-
sis if it occurs when the government dos not have the ability to meet the
higher debt service burden by taxation or reduction in spending.
The numbers can be staggeringly large. The government burden from a
bank bailout can easily be 20 or 30 percent and more of GDP. In addition,
there is easily a 10 or 15 percent increase in debt from high interest rates ap-
plied to a large debt and from recession-induced tax losses.
Also, there is always a large loss of reserves, which are sacrificed during the
defense part of the crisis. To some extent these may be captured by the
private sector and hence merely amount to a transfer, but often they are the
counterpart of a bet the government makes with the rest of the world and
loses. To the extent that a crisis experience weakens a country’s credit rating,
there is also a lasting cost in terms of a higher international cost of capital.
A currency crisis redistributes wealth and income. It is said that more
money was made in the few years of collapse of the Holy Roman Empire
than in the long years of its existence. The same is true of crises that enrich
those who can be in time in foreign exchange or can induce the government
to assume their debt while keeping their assets. That is routine. The striking
regularity, of course, is the dramatic fall in real wages and employment, as
well as the bankruptcy of small debtors.
Periods of recurrent currency crises translate into poor growth perfor-
mance, short horizons, slow increases in the standard of living, and a dete-
riorating social and economic infrastructure. Major asset sales along the
way, increases in external debt, or spurts of reform can obscure the degra-
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dation of the productive economy at any one time. However, ultimately
medium-term growth rates, far from reflecting catch-up, reflect the costs of
persistently poor finance.
16.7 The Alternative Medicine Controversy
There are two areas of controversy. The first involves capital controls, and
the second surrounds the appropriateness of IMF programs. On both issues
the controversy is alive and conducted with great vehemence.
The appropriateness of IMF programs is quite obviously questioned be-
cause they seem, at least on the surface, to make a bad situation worse. Rais-
ing interest rates at a time when balance sheets are already under water
makes a bad debt situation worse. Raising interest rates and tightening fis-
cal policy at a time when the economy is already in steep decline seems to
be outright counterproductive.
What are the alternatives? Capital flight will certainly continue as long as
the central bank pumps in credit at unchanged interest rates: obviously, the
immediate gains from borrowing in a depreciating currency far outweigh
the cost of borrowing. Hence, borrowing and capital flight remain active,
depreciation deepens, balance sheet problems increase—there is no obvi-
ous end to the process.
There are, of course, two ways of trying to reconcile unchanging interest
rates—rather than extraordinary short-run levels of 100 or 1,000 percent
per annum—with an end to capital outflows. One possibility is credit allo-
cation controls, and the other is capital control; the best possibility is a com-
bination of the two. There are obvious questions regarding the eﬀectiveness
of controls, but even if these are settled, there is also the issue of eﬃciency.
If controls were temporary, this might not be an issue, but if they are last-
ing, suspending the capital market is much more of an issue. For the system
at large, the presumption that controls are the response to outflows will re-
duce the perception of liquidity and hence translate into a higher cost of
capital and more trigger-happy investors.
Surely there is agreement that the better strategy is to reduce the risk of a
crisis situation, including means such as predetermined limits on liquidity
and profitability, but that leaves open the question of what to choose in the
midst of a crisis: IMF or controls. The debate continues.
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Table 16.2 Latin American Growth Per Capita
Year Growth Rate
1980–90 –0.3
1990–99 1.7
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